Global Commodity Chains and LINKSCH by Marshall, Alexander
Marshall: Global Commodity Chains and LINKSCH 
Working Paper 
2012 
 
1 | P a g e  
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..2 
Historical Overview……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4 
    Global Commodity Chain Theory……………………………………………………………………………………………………8 
    Global Commodity Chains and the Effects of Prohibition……………………………………………………………  14 
   The Scale and Nature of the Market: Analytical Problems……………………………………………………………  22 
   Case Study: Afghanistan opium/heroin as a GCC …..……………………………………………………………………..34 
Research Questions 
Unintended Consequences and GCC 
 (1): Rise in violence …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..42 
 (2)Rise in mark-ups and the presumption of an ‘inelastic market’……………………………………………..44 
 (3)The emergence of new governance networks, and the stigmatization 
 of social, religious and  ethnic groups............................................................................................. 45   
(4) ‘Resource curse’ or source of stabilization and local capital 
formation?......................................................................................................................................46 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marshall: Global Commodity Chains and LINKSCH 
Working Paper 
2012 
 
2 | P a g e  
 
 
Introduction 
The literature on the ‘unintended consequences’ of drug prohibition 
has been growing in recent years, ever since the landmark study of 
Tullis (Tullis, 1995) first put the term on the map. This thematic both 
offers another angle of approach for reviewing the legal regime created 
by the 1961, 1971 and 1988 UN drug conventions, beyond the pros 
and cons of prohibition itself, and also indirectly informs (although it is 
of course not limited to) the current, predominantly demand-focused turn 
towards harm reduction, an increasingly widely (although diversely) 
practiced set of modified treatment policies within the European context 
in the past decade, aimed generally at the prevention of overdoses 
amongst users, epidemic disease control, and the reduction of social 
harm (in this context see: O’Hare et al. (eds.), 1992, Erickson et al. 
(eds.), 1997, EU Drugs Strategy 2000-2004 and 2005-2012, Culley et 
al., 2012). The very fact of an increasing turn towards harm reduction 
in many European states has in fact often been read across as an 
area of ‘added value’ emerging out of the EU Drugs Strategy of 2005-
2012. Addressing the ‘unintended consequences’ of prohibition of course 
nonetheless clearly extends beyond instituting harm reduction measures 
targeted at the consumption market, and here research on global 
commodity chains (or value chains) clearly has some additional insight 
to offer. 
In 2008, the UNODC World Drugs Report itself listed five major 
unintended consequences (UCs) of the current global drug prohibition 
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regime, UCs repeated verbatim in numerous subsequent reports (for 
example Reuter & Trautmann, 2009, pp.46-48, Reuter 2009). These 
were: 
 The creation of criminal black markets; 
 Policy displacement (the propensity of a law-enforcement 
approach to crowd out the public-health dimension of 
counter-narcotics); 
 Geographical displacement, otherwise known as the ‘balloon 
effect’ 
 Substance displacement, whereby consumers move from one 
drug to another depending on fluctuations in availability and 
price; and 
 The social exclusion and marginalisation of drug users. 
(UNODC (2008), quoted in Inkster & Comolli, (2012): 53-4) 
This definition provides a starting point for further study, since the 
listed UCs certainly overlap with, but are by no means restricted to, 
areas also addressed by EU efforts aimed at both supply and demand 
reduction. The LINKSCH project of which this paper is a part aims to 
review the whole issue of UCs both from three different links in the 
chain-namely, how they manifest themselves along two commodity chains 
in the contexts of production, transit and consumption-but also from 
three different levels of implementation-the strategic, operational, and 
tactical (from inter-agency and inter-jurisdictional cooperation and conflict, 
down through shadow governance networks and ‘negotiated prohibition’, 
to the sub-state village, NGO and local community level). Naturally, 
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both time and available resources will only allow this to be done in a 
selective and provisional way, but hopefully it can also provide an 
informed stimulus for further policy debate. The LINKSCH project also 
proposes to do so utilizing the insights that can be drawn from two 
parallel literatures on both hybrid political regimes and global commodity 
chain (GCC) theory, applying these literatures to the study of two 
specific and currently geographically clearly distinct and identifiable 
production, trafficking and consumption chains, namely the networks 
Afghanistan-EU (heroin) and Morocco-EU (hashish). 
 The main deliverable prior to fieldwork in 2013 is an accurate 
state-of-the-art representation, from as wide an array of open sources 
as are presently available, of how these two commodity chains are 
currently perceived to operate in terms of levels of production, 
interdiction, and value mark-ups within selected countries. This paper 
however aims to summarise both the insights that can be drawn from 
the GCC literature more generally, and the specific research questions 
regarding UCs that could be read to flow from this literature. The full 
picture of how both these commodity chains are currently perceived to 
be operating will be the subject of another report, but elements of this 
paper, by presenting Afghanistan as an example case study, will in 
passing clearly also contribute to and inform that subsequent report. 
Historical Overview 
Global commodity chains in general date back to the first regular 
trans-oceanic voyages made by modern man. The discovery of highly 
desired commodities and addictive substances overseas played a 
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significant role in early forms of globalization. The trade in, respectively, 
precious metals and minerals (gold, silver, diamonds), alongside human 
slaves, luxury manufactures (silk, perfume, ceramics), and the early 
‘drug plagues’ (incorporating coffee, alcohol, tobacco and spices as well 
as opium) played a major role in both the birth of modern global 
capitalism, and the shift towards a more globally organized consumer 
society (Trocki, 1999, pp.28-32). The fetishization of many of these 
products by consumers far above what an abstract evaluation of their 
net worth might imply rendered long-distance transoceanic trade in such 
goods profitable almost overnight. The production process of sugar or 
coffee, for example remain- from a technological perspective- neither 
more complex, nor more expensive, than that of other agricultural 
products. The initial inherent rarity of these commodities in European 
markets, conjoined with what before long became their perceived 
absolute indispensability, nonetheless also led such trade goods to enjoy 
an elevated European market price totally unrelated to the actual costs 
of production, transit, or labour at source. When conducting his own 
study of the emergence of capitalism, Marx reckoned that the Brazilian 
sugar and coffee plantations had contributed, in just one and a half 
years, more net worth to the Brazilian economy- up to 1823- than 
over eighty years of indigenous diamond mining, a disparity which he 
accredited to the greater concentration of labour for relatively less 
return characteristic of the latter (Marx, 1967, p.40). Even today, the 
average mark-up on coffee between farm gate and retail sale is 
estimated at 413 per cent (Wilson & Stevens, 2008, p.2).  
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The ‘unintended consequences’ of such new trading patterns-in 
effect, the emergence of an early form of global capitalism- were both 
rapid and diverse. The world became redivided along new lines, 
divisions determined no longer simply by geography (roads, mountains, 
oceans and rivers) but by the localized abundance of goods in high 
demand within the world market, and by the availability of local 
specializations best able to integrate such raw materials into an 
increasingly industrialized and professionalized production chain. 
Commodities ceased to be produced and consumed entirely locally, 
using predominantly handicraft techniques, but instead saw their 
production processes both rapidly mechanized, and increasingly integrated 
both vertically and horizontally within a wider value chain. The newly 
emerging phenomenon of a global commodity chain represented 
‘interorganizational networks clustered around one commodity or product, 
linking households, enterprises and states to one another within the 
world-economy’ (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994, p.2). The governance of 
such networks also became increasingly fragmented as time went on, 
although imperial powers continue to vie to attempt to achieve near-
monopoly dominance in certain ‘strategic’ markets even today (witness 
Anglo-American dominance of oil exploitation in the Persian Gulf during 
much of the twentieth century, or recent Chinese moves to acquire a 
near-dominance of the global mining market in Rare Earth minerals).  
Amongst the many benign and not so benign unintended 
consequences of the emergence of such global commodity chains were 
the creation of new professions and new forms of work; the rise of 
new political actors on the international stage, such as multinational 
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firms, alongside new social and ethical-based rights movements (Fair 
Trade, Oxfam). These changes ran alongside the rise of global finance 
capital, spurred on by the need for freer access to credit (essential, 
for example, to cover the early sunk costs and inherent insurance risks 
of large scale shipbuilding or railroad building); and the restructuring 
and reorientation of individual states’ whole environment and labour 
market around the production of certain commodities in high global 
demand. Brazil for example, to take again the case study that attracted 
Marx’s early attention, evolved during the nineteenth century into the 
world’s single largest coffee exporter, and produced five times as much 
as the rest of the world combined by 1906 (Topik in Baer, 2009, 
p.46). The emergence of such global supply chains arguably also 
provided capitalism as a whole with a ‘spatial fix’ that enabled it to 
maintain its overall rates of profitability; once this phenomenon had 
gained a firm foothold, capitalist firms themselves were then left free to 
geographically and politically reallocate both profit and loss, basic labour 
inputs and value-adding activity, laterally across a trans-continental scale, 
increasingly bypassing both national governments and organized labour 
movements by the end of the twentieth century (Harvey, 2004, Arrighi, 
2002, 2007)   
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, drugs now formally 
prohibited from production except for medical purposes emerged at first 
as lightly regulated global commodity chains much like any other. After 
1780, Warren Hastings and the British East India Company (EIC) 
centralized and took over the poppy cultivation market in NE India, 
creating a cartel that was effectively able to compel farmers to grow 
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poppy, restrict & control cultivation and production levels, and implement 
quality control measures. By 1797 this opium monopoly was under the 
direct management of a government agency, even as opium also 
remained prohibited in China, the main target market for EIC opium. 
By the 1820s, opium was the second largest source of EIC 
government revenue in India after land revenues, and carried the 
additional benefit of delivering large and immediate cash payments into 
government coffers-effectively financing the British Empire (Trocki, 1999). 
It also formed the largest single item of export for the first two-thirds 
of the nineteenth century, whilst Chinese efforts at prohibition also led 
to the Anglo-Chinese ‘Opium Wars’ of 1839-42 and 1856-60. In 
Indonesia by the end of the nineteenth century, the Dutch administered 
1,065 opium retail outlets, which covered 15 percent of that state’s 
colonial administration costs, while in the British colony of Malaya 
(Malaysia), opium sales covered 53 percent of overall administrative 
costs. British and Dutch pharmaceutical companies and commercial 
interests at the time were also transplanting coca bush cultivation to 
Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, India, Indonesia and British Guyana, in 
order to reduce shipping times and to meet rising demand for cocaine, 
whilst the Dutch at the time were also the world’s leading cocaine 
producer (Buxton, 2006, p.16).  
Unlike opium, coca did not become a major export commodity 
until the latter part of the nineteenth century, (cocaine itself having first 
been chemically isolated only in 1860), but in Latin America between 
1860 and 1910, two German and US-dominated commercial chains 
quickly linked Andean coca with global markets (Gootenberg, 2001). 
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During this period cough medicines, health elixirs, and commercially 
available medical anaesthetics made liberal use of cocaine, opium and 
marijuana’s recognized chemical properties, and the first two drugs in 
particular were widely used in both Europe and North America to treat 
conditions as diverse as dysentery, malaria, cholera, nervous exhaustion, 
depression and nymphomania (Buxton, 2006, pp.14-18). In 1898 heroin, 
first synthesized in 1874, was for the first time commercially produced 
from opium, and ironically was thereafter initially legally prescribed as 
an effective alternate treatment for morphine dependence. By the latter 
part of the nineteenth century however, greater regulation of these 
drugs had already begun, (UNODC, 2010, pp.29-33) and the move 
towards complete prohibition except for medical use accelerated under 
consistent pressure from the United States, the leading sponsor behind 
both the 1909 Shanghai Conference and the 1912 International Opium 
Convention. The establishment by the interwar period of the League of 
Nations saw the first consolidated attempt to implement a global 
prohibition regime, and post-war efforts to further tighten and regulate 
the global market then culminated in the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and 
the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances.  
Global Commodity Chain Theory 
The story retold above makes clear that drugs such as heroin, 
cocaine and marijuana, which are central subjects of the modern 
international prohibition regime, emerged in the late eighteenth and 
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nineteenth centuries as global commodity chains generated by consumer 
demand, much like any other (coffee, sugar, silk, diamonds etc.). 
Theoretical thinking around global commodity chains significantly post-
dates their actual emergence as a modern economic phenomenon 
however. The term commodity chain itself was first employed in 1977 
in an article by Hopkins and Wallerstein, which endeavoured to refocus 
attention on the global redivision of labour that had occurred within the 
world economy over time. This early thinking on global commodity 
chains was heavily influenced by world systems theory, which itself 
assigned analytical importance to so-called ‘Kondratiev waves’, or cycles 
of expansion and contraction within the world economy.1 During so-
called phases of economic contraction, (B-phases), the geographical 
scope of a commodity chain is held to reduce as the overall number 
of producers shrink, whilst vertical integration of the chain during such 
periods of time is also held to increase (firms taking up more of the 
links of a chain within their own organization). In pursuit of security 
from shrinking profit margins, holders of capital during such periods 
also shift their stocks from production to finance, whilst the loci of 
production itself also shift from higher-wage to lower-wage regions (Bair, 
2009, pp.7-8, Wallerstein, 2003, pp.50-1). According to Wallerstein’s own 
writings, the world economy as a whole has been in a B-phase of 
contraction since at least 1967/73 (Wallerstein, 2003, pp.46-7). Due to 
the difficulty of building a consensus around such assertions however, 
the LINKSCH project does not intend to employ Kondratiev economic 
                                                          
1
 Nikolai Kondrat’ev (1892-1938), Russian economist, founder of Kondrat’ev wave theory, supporter of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) in the Soviet Union, tried and executed under Stalin’s rule during the Great Purges. 
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cycle theory in its analysis of current illicit commodity chains, not least 
due to the difficulty of correlating illicit economies with wider trends in 
the licit global market. Some published work does nonetheless 
investigate the linkages between the two, most notably the pioneering 
studies of Pierre Kopp and Guilhem Fabre (Kopp, 2003, Fabre, 2002) 
Global commodity chain research evolved further during the 1980s, 
and has today produced two further clearly identifiable schools of 
thought beyond those initially working within the framework of world 
systems theory. Gary Gereffi between 1994 and 1995 established four 
of the main characteristics of global commodity chains, or GCCs, 
namely: 
(1) An input-output structure, describing the process 
of transforming raw materials into final products 
(2) A territoriality, or geographical configuration 
(3) A governance structure which describes both how control is 
exerted and value redistributed by lead firms (or ‘chain drivers’) 
(4) An institutional (legal, but not only legal) context which 
describes the ‘rules of the game’ 
From Gereffi’s contribution emerged a school of thought that 
identified GCCs as a relatively recent historical phenomenon, one bound 
up with the politics of industrialisation and development, and one in 
turn primarily hinged on the emergence of the modern firm (Bair, 2009, 
p.9).  
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This school of thought also distinguished different dynamics 
between two ideal-typical governance structures: producer and buyer-
driven global commodity chains (PDCCs vs. BDCCs). Car manufacturing 
has been held in the past for example to be a classic PDCC. These 
chains are typically capital intensive, with high capital and technological 
requirements constituting major barriers to entry, leading to domination 
by powerful manufacturers with a tight vertically integrated supply base. 
Textile manufacture is by contrast often analyzed as a BDCC, more 
labour-intensive, with market information, branding, product design and 
marketing/advertising costs the main barrier to entry. This entails far 
flung subcontracting arrangements managed by retailers and marketers, 
who generally make few of the actual products sold under their label. 
Later studies have further problematized this initial binary distinction, 
with software manufacture for example being classified as technology-
driven, and individual commodity chains having more than one 
institutional strand within their makeup (Bair, 2009, p.20, Gibbon, 2008, 
pp.320-1). As, from the 1980s onwards, policies of structural adjustment 
implemented by the IMF placed increasing pressure on developing 
countries to abandon state-centric import substitution strategies in favour 
of export orientated industrialisation (EOI) instead, embracing low tariffs, 
open borders, greater freedom of movement for labour and capital, and 
extensive privatisation, the relevance of GCC theory for understanding 
local shifts in power in the eyes of those working within the field of 
development studies increased. Most obviously, China after 1980 became 
a key supply node for a huge variety of the West’s manufactured 
products, leading to structural shifts both in the West (from industrial 
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manufacturing to the service industries) and in China itself (from rural 
agriculture and domestic-facing industry, to export-orientated small 
component and goods manufacture in the cities, with accompanying 
waves of demographically significant migration from the countryside to 
the cities).   
During the early 2000s a third school, global value chain analysis 
(GVC) also arose (Bair, 2009, p.12). Whilst drawing on both the 
previous two schools of thought, GVC analysis has also been strongly 
influenced by transaction cost economics. This latter school of analysis 
emerged earlier, in the 1970s. Simply stated, it sought to analyze the 
conditions under which the transaction costs associated with operating 
on the competitive, free open market incentivized firms to internalize a 
greater percentage of their transaction exchanges instead. In the 
computer operating system market, this distinction is for example 
embodied by the different business strategies of Apple vs. Microsoft. 
Where Apple elected at an early stage upon a vertically integrated and 
highly brand-centric business model, with bespoke hardware and 
software design, and even closely supervised technical manufacture, 
Microsoft by contrast adopted a flatter, horizontal model of licensing out 
their software to a diverse variety of technical manufacturers and 
hardware suppliers.  
The GVC school places emphasis on the governance issues 
faced by individual firms when choosing between vertical integration or 
market coordination, with respect to three permanent operating variables:  
(1) the level of information 
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(2) the complexities of transactions 
(3) the capabilities of the supply base.  
I note in passing here that the earlier world systems theory approach 
of Kondratieff cycles, embracing a holistic view of global processes and 
their consequences, is self-evidently largely abandoned by this school, in 
favour of variables that are governance chain specific; the emphasis 
here is upon firm behaviour, rather than larger swings in the global 
economy. Chains when analysed by this form of thinking can then be 
further codified as: 
(1) Modular value chains, where suppliers are highly competent, 
and it is possible to codify transactions. Suppliers make 
products to a customer’s specifications, and take full 
responsibility for producing certain stages in the value chain. 
The relationship between brand-name electronics companies like 
Apple and their subcontracted manufacturers is representative 
here. 
(2) Relational value chains, likely to be built where it is difficult 
to codify the trade relation, and characterised by complex 
interactions, incomplete contracts, and mutual interdependence. 
(3) Captive value chains, where suppliers face a high cost in 
switching to other customers, and so depend heavily on the 
lead firm. Captive suppliers are generally assumed to have 
limited capabilities, and lead firms often interfere strongly in 
their operations (Altenburg, 2007, p.503, Bair, 2009, p.21). 
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Global Commodity Chains, Illicit Drugs,  and the Effects of Prohibition 
The modern illicit drugs industry represents a series of global 
commodity chains governed by distinct and unique legal structures, 
which greatly impede both the transparent flow of information between 
suppliers and consumers, and also block the very formation of firms in 
the modern conventional sense. Illegality itself therefore has a tendency 
both to dramatically increase transaction costs and to favour the 
creation of relational value chains. Regulation today arose out of a 
long-running historical perception of the consumption of certain drugs as 
generating a series of socially unacceptable policy problems in modern 
societies. All attempts at regulation and control however are invariably 
also shaped by the social relations and networks generated by 
regulation itself, whilst many attempts to redefine a policy problem have 
also often occurred without considering the built-in cumulative impact 
that previous policy has had on the generation of current issues 
(Collingridge,1992).  
Criminalization quickly produced parallel governance structures, 
formal and informal, whilst depriving workers within the illicit sector of 
even the bare minimum of negotiating rights and powers that exist in 
licit industries. The imposition of prohibition simultaneously also 
introduced proxy new international governance structures (the UNDCP 
which became, post-1997, the UNODC, and which also incorporates the 
secretariat of the INCB), tasked by the international community with 
attempting to monitor and tackle on a global scale the production and 
transit of drugs now categorized as illicit. However it also promoted, by 
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default, the emergence and proliferation of new actors and informal 
parallel social, economic, and political networks, devoted to continuing to 
produce and supply these now illicit substances. Insurgent groups have 
for example periodically gained additional political and economic capital 
by allying, for limited tactical reasons, with producers and traffickers, as 
witnessed by groups as diverse as the Taliban in Afghanistan, the 
KMT army in NE Burma’s Shan state, FARC in Colombia, Shining Path 
in Peru, and the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) in Sri Lanka (Felbab-Brown, 
2010, Reuter et al., 2004).  
The process of prohibition itself has in practice also been 
implemented in a variety of ways, and with varying degrees of 
governmental enthusiasm and energy, creating a scenario within many 
individual countries of ‘negotiated prohibition’. The regulatory environment 
is therefore pluralistic in terms of the rewards and punishments it 
delivers, from trafficker to consumer; but the strength of the state itself 
to impose and implement regulation in the strictest sense has frequently 
also been contingent on local circumstances. Peter Lupsha has devised 
a scale for describing the nature of interaction between criminal groups 
and the state which captures the level of ‘hybridity’ within the system, 
shown below (Lupsha, 1996). In practice, many states slide between 
the relationships described by Lupsha as predatory and parasitic at 
relatively frequent intervals; only in a very small minority of cases, such 
as Afghanistan, has the relationship arguably at times become almost 
completely symbiotic. 
Predatory Parasitic Symbiotic 
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Criminal groups 
in antagonistic 
relationship with 
the state. 
Criminal groups 
achieve limited 
engagement with 
the state, and are 
able to suborn 
parts of it. 
Mutual dependence between 
criminal groups and the state. 
 
 Prohibition once imposed internationally however, nonetheless had 
powerful structural consequences on the nodal points of already extant 
drug commodity chains, and upon the restructuring of benefits and 
costs for states associated with production and transit in particular. The 
geography of production alone faced a massive global restructuring, as 
measures to tighten the ban on production intensified. Licit and illicit 
opium production fell by some three quarters between 1906/07 and 
2010, but with the biggest falls occurring prior to 1970. Global opium 
production had declined to a historical low by 1970, but then started 
to dramatically increase again. Its revival however this time also 
occurred on a geographically much more constrained scale, due to 
Turkey, Iran and China having effectively almost left the international 
illicit opium market. During the 1970s, production became much more 
densely concentrated around the so-called ‘Golden Triangle’ and ‘Golden 
Crescent’ regions instead, with this process reaching an extreme when, 
in 2007, Afghanistan alone reportedly accounted for 92 per cent of the 
world’s illicit opium production.  
Cannabis, as still the world’s single most widely produced and 
consumed illicit drug alongside ATS, has witnessed the opposite 
production trend from opium/heroin, with new hydroponic techniques 
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leading to widespread cultivation in many developed countries, countries 
which in the past were never significant sources of supply. The relative 
intensity with which prohibition is itself implemented has no doubt also 
played a major role here, with long jail sentences for heroin or 
cocaine possession contrasting for example with traditionally very low 
incarceration rates (as opposed to arrest rates) for marijuana possession 
in most countries (Caulkins & Reuter, 2010, p.219). Whether considered 
in either direction however, the greater segmentation of the market as 
a consequence of prohibition has thus become one of the chief 
characteristics of the modern global illicit drug industry.  
The increased risk generated by prohibition, and the associated 
emergence of new trafficking routes also created, in a number of 
states, increased levels of violence, although no single straight line of 
causality can be drawn between the scale of instability and the scale 
of illicit production. In some states, such as Colombia, the level of 
violence generated by networks of producers, insurgents and pro-
government militias reached a scale that threatened to destabilize the 
state itself, even when the actual scale of earnings associated with the 
illicit drug industry in fact never exceeded 8 per cent of national GDP. 
In the case of Afghanistan by contrast, the internal insurgent threat has 
to date been effectively contained by international coalition forces. The 
scale of the internal drug economy has nonetheless grown dramatically 
since 2001, reaching the equivalent of 48 per cent of licit GDP in 
2007 before falling back in more recent years (Inkster & Comolli, 2012, 
p.67).  
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If the scale of the drug trade and associated corruption has 
been widely seen as destabilising in Afghanistan however, it has also 
more recently been argued that the ‘limited access order’ generated by 
the Burmese state’s management of the internal drug ‘problem’ in the 
1990s had, if anything, a stabilizing effect on what had until then been 
a long-running civil war. In the case of Burma/Myanmar, the Burmese 
central government’s use of the carrots and sticks created by 
prohibition, via the extraction of rents from the drug trade, combined 
with the threat of coercion and violence, generated a degree of 
leverage between the centre and periphery where previously arguably 
little room for cooption existed (Meehan, 2011). Chouvy and Laniel 
(2007) have likewise argued for the role of hashish production in the 
Rif areas of Morocco as effectively a substitute development strategy, 
compensating for a recent fall in income from licit agricultural raw 
materials, and thereby fulfilling a role as a temporary guarantor of 
stability via continued employment opportunities in parts of the country 
where otherwise social and political turbulence might prevail (Chouvy & 
Laniel, 2007). The hybrid political regimes produced both by prohibition, 
and the more general phenomenon of ‘limited access orders’ in much 
of the global south, therefore possess the capability to generate a full 
gamut of second and third order political and social unintended 
consequences, from outcomes that are clearly violently destabilizing (in 
parts of Latin America and West Africa) to, in practice, internal 
accommodations that generate a fragile form of stability and equilibrium.2 
                                                          
2
 ‘Limited access orders’ are here generally defined following the definition offered by Douglass North et al., 
and which can be understood in part as a means to analysing the difference in political makeup between 
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Levels of violence also vary dramatically in the ‘limited access 
orders’ of many major transit chain countries, even when taking into 
account that the imposition of prohibition anywhere always raises levels 
of violence both at the border, and within many state’s inner cities. 
Mexico, a major transit state in the Latin American cocaine trade, has 
in recent years been devastated by levels of violence more often 
associated with intra-state civil war than with mere drug trafficking. 
Russia and the Central Asian states by contrast, although far from 
peaceful, have not suffered anything like the same levels of directly 
attributable violence from their positions as major transit chain countries 
in the Afghan heroin trade. Such an outcome arguably reflects both 
their more tightly enforced controls on civilian arms trafficking, different 
political and cultural contexts, and potentially also the radically more 
porous and less combative nature of local interdiction efforts, due to 
corruption and-in the case of Tajikistan at least- comparatively much 
weaker border infrastructure. Between 2003 and 2005, for example, 
Russia seized just over four metric tons of heroin and opium within its 
own borders, whilst Iran, a state-according to UNODC figures- of 
comparable significance in the overall Afghan trafficking chain, seized 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
countries with average per capita income of $400, and upper income countries where the average per capita 
income is $35,000. As North et al., (2007) state: ‘The upper-income, advanced industrial countries of the world 
today all have market economies with open competition, competitive multi-party democratic political systems, 
and a secure government monopoly over violence. Such open access orders, however, are not the only norm 
and equilibrium type of society. The middle and low-income developing countries today, like all countries 
before about 1800, can be understood as limited access orders that maintain their equilibrium in a 
fundamentally different way. In limited access orders, the state does not have a secure monopoly on violence, 
and society organizes itself to control violence among the elite factions. A common feature of limited access 
orders is that political elites divide up control of the economy, each getting some share of the rents. Since 
outbreaks of violence reduce the rents, the elite factions have incentives to be peaceable most of the time. 
Adequate stability of the rents and thus of the social order requires limiting access and competition—hence a 
social order with a fundamentally different logic than the open access order.’   
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just over 32 metric tons (Paoli, Greenfield & Reuter, 2009, p.47). The 
variation in the effectiveness of interdiction and prohibition produced by 
such variations in hybridity clearly also impact on the ‘transaction costs’ 
of those organisations engaged in the illicit GCC concerned. This would 
tend to further the hypothesis that regional markets clearly exist within 
the overall chain which exhibit their own particular social, political and 
cultural specificities, carrying further clear policy implications when it 
comes to measuring and attempting to ameliorate the social costs of 
enforcing prohibition. The GVC literature therefore clearly also has 
insights to offer, albeit in a more limited way, to attempting to 
understand the opaque decision making processes of organisations 
involved in the production and trafficking of illicit drugs along the two 
illicit commodity chains that are the subject of the current study. 
Illicit trafficking networks obviously also operate without the key 
safety net available to legal organizations of enforceable legal contracts, 
fixed business locations, or market analysts and international advertising 
arms. The two main immediate consequences of prohibition here are 
therefore (a) the intended rendering of the trade more opaque overall 
in terms of available statistics, both to outside observers, those 
engaged in enforcement, and direct participants, and (b) the dynamic 
restructuring of the production and transit arrangements related to these 
substances around entirely unregulated small-world, or ‘dark’, networks 
which, by organising in a manner that resembles cottage industries, 
thereby acquired increased resilience (Benson & Decker, 2010, Malm & 
Bilcher, 2011). Price-setting monopolies or cartels are largely noticeable 
by their absence, and studies of consumption markets also provide 
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provisional evidence that drug retailers are predominantly price takers 
rather than price setters (Paoli, 2002, Pietschmann, 2004, p.117). Kopp 
(2004) characterizes the system as a ‘non-cartelized oligopoly’, with high 
transaction costs prevailing and high-but not insuperable- barriers to 
market entry, the latter generated by risk rather than technology (Kopp, 
2004, pp.27-37). Modern trafficking networks therefore predominantly 
appear to be informal networks of individuals which lack vertical 
integration, but correspondingly also demonstrate greater flexibility, 
resourcefulness and adaptability. This nonetheless still leaves open the 
question of whether such networks, as they currently operate, are 
PDCC or BDCC-in other words, who and where the ‘chain drivers’ are, 
where value is principally added, and where the greatest profits are 
reinvested. Because these two characteristics affect the whole nature of 
the LINKSCH study when it comes to trying to measure UCs in the 
current market, a pause will be made here to try to expand upon 
their main implications. 
The Scale and Nature of the Market: Analytical Problems   
 The opaque nature of the international drugs trade is reflected 
in the literature on the exact size and impact of the industry, the 
diversity of which complicates tremendously any effort to draw a state 
of the art picture of the two commodity chains under current 
consideration within their wider context. Figures on the overarching scale 
of the international illicit drug trade vary wildly depending upon what 
statistics and data are included or excluded. Although money laundering 
for example forms a major factor in the financial flows associated with 
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drug trafficking, it is almost impossible to disaggregate exactly the scale 
of money laundering associated with the drug trade from that 
associated with fraud and other forms of organized crime. In 2011, the 
UNODC updated earlier work done in 1998 by the IMF, to estimate 
that an annual average of 3.6 per cent of global GDP was illicit 
money-laundering activity, of which money related to transnational 
organized crime constituted 1.5 per cent of global GDP, or $870 billion 
in 2009 (UNODC, 2011a, p.5). Illicit drug trafficking itself was here then 
also taken to account for about half of all transnational organized crime 
revenues. 
In the UNODC report, one key transnational sector, the global 
market in cocaine, was also studied, and an analysis was conducted of 
the socio-economic costs of drug abuse vs. the illicit income generated 
by drug trafficking. In every instance, the social costs of drug abuse 
were calculated to exceed the gains generated from illicit trafficking by 
a factor of two or even three to one. Pure anti-money laundering 
activity, as opposed to anti-trafficking activity, was also judged by this 
report to be strikingly ineffective; less than 1 per cent of the proceeds 
of crime laundered via the financial system were reportedly seized and 
frozen. In the particular case study that the report then made of 
cocaine, the gross profits of cocaine sales were estimated at $84 
billion in 2009, with the profits generated overwhelmingly made in North 
America and West and Central Europe. A model was then also 
developed to argue that of the $53 billion generated for money 
laundering from this trade, slightly less than half-some $26.2 billion- 
would leave the jurisdictions where the profits were generated to be 
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reinvested elsewhere, predominantly in the Caribbean and Central 
America (UNODC 2011a, p.7, 72-95). 
UNODC reports on the scale of the global illicit drug trade and 
the profits it generates have however been challenged by a number of 
other studies in the past. In 2005, Francisco Thoumi underlined the 
‘soft’ and frequently ideologically biased nature of many of the 
estimates made around the overall scale of the global drug trade, 
remarking that ‘[m]any times data are quoted without a reference to 
sources, at others it even appears that figures are spontaneously 
produced or invented’ (Thoumi, 2005, p.186). Thoumi pointed out that- 
for example- National Institute of Drug Abuse data (NIDA) assumes that 
all drug consumption is drug abuse when calculating the economic 
costs of illicit drug consumption. Meanwhile the initial figure of $500 
billion ascribed in 1997 as the total value of the illicit drug industry by 
the UNDCP also became an embarrassment, and was correspondingly 
subsequently revised downwards, but with the revised figure then finally 
rounded up again, to $400 billion, in the 1997 official report (Thoumi, 
2005, pp.188-9). The Financial Action Task Force in 1999 then 
commissioned a report by Peter Reuter, which revised the estimated 
size of the global illicit drug market downwards a second time, but this 
final (unpublished) report still left a wide margin of error, by producing 
a new estimate of the market as worth between $45 and $280 billion. 
 Reuter himself has written eloquently on the difficulties of 
gaining exact estimates on the size of the global drug trade, and has 
underlined in particular the frequent substitution of final retail figures for 
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the actual figures of the trade itself (which are much smaller). The 
1997 $400 billion dollar estimate for example was, Reuter pointed out, 
an estimate of total retail expenditures rather than trade flows, one 
further distorted by using US prices. It had therefore been arrived at 
very approximately by (for example) multiplying the global quantity of 
heroin consumed by US retail prices, although the US accounts for 
only about 5 per cent of global heroin consumption. Prices for heroin 
in Europe are markedly lower than in the US, being at the time of 
Reuter’s study approximately one tenth the US retail price; in Asian 
nations such as Pakistan, which have their own very substantial addict 
communities, the street price remains much lower again (Reuter & 
Greenfield, 2001, pp.160-2). In true trade terms, Reuter estimated the 
actual scale of the illicit drug market at a much more modest $20-25 
billion annually, more comparable to other agricultural products than 
industrial necessities such as oil, iron or steel. 
In 2009, a report commissioned by the EU on the global drug 
market between 1998 and 2007, and executed by RAND Europe and 
the Trimbos institute, again radically revised downwards the global drug 
revenue estimates made by the UNODC in 2002/3, re-rating the 
financial value of the global cannabis market for example, via 
employment of a demand-side analysis, at about half the UNODC’s 
earlier estimate. This report also estimated that smuggling accounted for 
approximately 10 per cent of the mark up in the global retail price of 
heroin or cocaine, with the vast majority of costs occurring at the 
stage of domestic distribution in consuming countries (Reuter & 
Trautmann, 2009, pp.xi-xii, Kilmer & Pacula, 2009, pp.8-22, 67-73). This 
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research was further underlined in the 2010 study of Caulkins & 
Reuter, which argued that importation (trafficking) accounted for about 
12 percent of the total mark up on a gram of cocaine when 
comparing retail price in Chicago to the farm gate price in Colombia 
(Caulkins & Reuter, 2010, p.229-30).  
Such analysis certainly appears to challenge earlier studies such 
as that by UNESCO in 1999, which had assigned carriers and 
traffickers 26 percent of overall profits, versus 54 percent accruing to 
distributors in consumer countries (UNESCO, 1999, p.6). However as 
Kopp (2004, p.23) amongst others has pointed out, a major 
methodological problem here arises from the shortage of information 
available regarding the actions of dealers operating at the level 
between wholesale and retail3. Contestation around this issue therefore 
remains. In a subsequent 2008 case study of the UK, the mark-up 
between farm gate opium and Turkish dealers was estimated at 1, 800 
per cent, whilst between those dealers and the drug entering the UK, 
a further mark-up of 420 per cent reportedly occurred, leading to an 
estimated price differential between farm gate and UK street price per 
kilo of £450 vs. £75,750, or a mark-up of 16,800 percent (Wilson & 
Stevens, 2008, p.2). Following this model for the Afghan-UK heroin 
chain, the mark-ups within the consuming country are arguably 
comparable with the mark-ups on licit goods (coffee); it is the mark-ups 
in transit which are extraordinary.  
                                                          
3
 ‘Retail’ here being defined as the sale of quantities of drugs running from 10 to 500 grams. 
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Given that the consumption market is generally held to be 
inelastic4, and that the increased risks associated with trafficking a 
prohibited substance are therefore often held to account for these 
extremely high mark-ups -itself one of the largest unintended 
consequences of the current prohibition regime-this process clearly merits 
further testing and interrogation. Detailed studies of individual production 
‘boxes’ within current illicit commodity chains, such as Afghanistan, 
further complicate the picture, since they highlight that local commodity 
prices for illicit opium and heroin are also highly dynamic, dependent 
on local agricultural, political and meteorological conditions. In a study 
published in 2006 reviewing dry opium prices in Kandahar and 
Nangarhar since 1997, Byrd and Jonglez highlighted considerable price 
volatility on a daily basis within Afghanistan, but also the strategic 
impact of such events as the 2000-01 Taliban opium cultivation ban. In 
Nangarhar, counter-narcotics campaigns from late 2004 to 2005 led both 
to greater relative rural impoverishment, and to an increase in local 
opium prices (Byrd & Buddenberg, 2006, pp.119-30). Further variables 
include the conversion rate achieved between opium and heroin, 
(estimated in Afghanistan at 6:1), and the tendency of downstream 
distributors to vary quantity and particularly purity rather than price. In 
general, the data available to date suggests that price shocks upstream 
in the Afghan commodity chain have been consistently absorbed at 
intermediary stages, via modifying product purity, price manipulation, and 
                                                          
4
 The definition of an ‘elastic’ market is one where a 1 per cent increase in prices would result in a greater than 
1 percent decrease in consumption (Pietschmann (2004), p.109). 
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adjustments in existing inventories, and therefore both relative supply 
and price were structurally stable downstream up until 2010.  
Two economic models (developed by Jonathan P. Caulkins) 
currently exist to correlate price in Afghanistan to price setting 
behaviour in neighbouring countries-the ‘additive’ and the ‘multiplicative’ 
price model. If an additive price model is assumed, interventions in 
producer countries by external actors should be considered a waste of 
money. An increase of $100 per kg of opium in Afghanistan would 
translate into a $1 increase in the retail price of a gram of heroin 
(assuming a 10:1 kg conversion rate between opium and heroin), an 
increase totally insufficient to alter consumer behaviour. A multiplicative 
model by contrast would more than justify supply side intervention by 
being highly cost efficient, since a three-fold increase in the opium 
price in Afghanistan (say from $50 to $150) would be directly passed 
on in a three-fold increase in the retail price. Both models rely on 
certain fixed assumptions-in the additive model, that traffickers receive a 
fixed price for their services, in the multiplicative model that profit 
margins, reflecting risk, are unchanged. Examination of actual opium and 
heroin price changes in countries neighbouring Afghanistan in 2001-2003 
has suggested a market which operates in reality somewhere between 
the two models, in the sense that prices predicted by the additive 
model are continuously surpassed, but prices predicted by the 
multiplicative model, though nearer the mark, are never reached 
(Pietschmann, 2004, pp.120-5). Final retail prices in Europe were also 
largely unaffected, despite a doubling or tripling of heroin prices in 
countries neighbouring Afghanistan; this was accompanied, however, by 
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major changes in recorded purity per gram. In the UK, heroin prices in 
nominal terms declined by 10 percent in 2000-01, but the changes to 
purity of a gram of heroin during the same period, it has been 
argued, were equivalent to an effective price rise of over 80 percent 
(Pietschmann, 2004, p.134). Whilst Skott and Jepson (2002) have 
argued that global demand for heroin is inelastic meanwhile, Caulkins 
(1995) has also argued for a degree of relative elasticity.      
The opaque nature of the drug market is further reflected in the 
frequency of apparently non-rational market behaviour. Between 1998 
and 2006, global levels of opium production were relatively stable, but 
large production increases that then followed in Afghanistan found no 
correlation, either in further globally recorded sharp price declines, or in 
sudden increases in consumption (flooding the market). Many analysts 
therefore assumed extensive stockpiling of this output to have taken 
place instead, in both Afghanistan and Central Asia. Earlier stockpiling 
activity for example is accredited with having cushioned the market 
effects of the Taliban cultivation ban of 2001 (Lewis, 2010, Paoli, 
Greenfield & Reuter, 2009, pp.57, 85). Drug seizures in both Russia 
and Central Asia meanwhile also appear to have declined in inverse 
proportion to the actual quantities trafficked, again suggestive of a trend 
of turning either opium or processed heroin into a longer-term 
investment asset. However the opaque nature of the market again 
renders the exact scale of this phenomenon a source of some dispute. 
The stockpiling argument might initially appear to have relevance to the 
recent 2010-12 heroin ‘drought’ reported in many parts of Europe (2010 
data shown below taken from Hallam), which could at first glance be 
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interpreted to have occurred for strategic reasons (restraining supply to 
raise the street price). 
 
 Although this on the surface could be interpreted as an effort 
to rig the market to release stockpiled inventories at an increased 
price, this (geographically uneven) drop in supply has been attributed 
by others to a recent round of severe Afghan crop blight, to intensified 
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conflict in southern Afghanistan and the accompanying disruption of 
local logistical networks, and to more effective intelligence cooperation 
and interdiction, particularly in targeting the Turkish transport mafias 
involved (Hallam, 2011). The recent EMCDDA trendspotter report also 
highlighted the possible role of record seizures of heroin precursor 
chemicals in Europe in 2008-9, alongside the factor of recent flooding 
in Pakistan (EMCDDA, 2011, p.5) The displacement of addicts onto 
more adulterated forms of heroin meanwhile also carries the unintended 
consequence of an increase in mortality (death through overdoses) when 
purer forms of heroin again re-enter the marketplace. 
 At the same time, longer term studies suggest recent shifts to 
be historically somewhat of an anomaly. During an era of increased 
law enforcement focus on interdiction and supply-side eradication, with 
exponential increases in rates of incarceration, the European and North 
American purity-adjusted street price for heroin and cocaine in practice, 
at least between the start of the 1980s and 2010, fell sharply 
(Caulkins & Reuter, 2010). This also occurred against a backdrop of a 
stable overall consumer market and increased seizures; between 1998 
and 2009 for example, seizures of cocaine, heroin, morphine and 
cannabis almost doubled (UNODC, 2011, p.15). A rational market model 
would assume that increased pressure and shipment seizures would 
lead to a spike in street prices, as demand outstripped supply. 
Previous studies of global opium production though, looking at trends 
between 1996 and 2003, have highlighted that production has 
consistently exceeded both consumption and interdiction combined (Paoli, 
Greenfield & Reuter, 2009, p.101). This suggests that, in response to 
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legal crackdowns, drug producers over that longer timeframe may have 
both engaged in deliberate overproduction as an insurance strategy, and 
also increased the efficiency, relative innovation, and resilience of their 
networks, via new networking opportunities. This has arguably led prices 
to fall due to economies of scale, in a manner not dissimilar to other 
(licit) industries. This could certainly be argued to have occurred in 
both production and trafficking, where trafficking networks from Latin 
America for example have both multiplied and geographically diversified, 
(reducing the impact of losing individual nodes-for example the loss of 
particular airfields- in the chain). Producers on the ground have also 
made efforts to increase the physical resilience of their crops, as well 
as (in the case of Afghanistan) cross-cultivating with food crops to 
present greater challenges to crop spraying. 
 In addition to the role played by wider geopolitical events, such 
as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the explosion of new drug 
markets in Russia and Eastern Europe after 1989-91, which have more 
than offset modest drops in demand elsewhere, increasingly stringent 
enforcement may also have led to the entry of new actors into the 
market, incentivized by the increased profits that accompany increased 
risk, as well as a displacement of networks in a number of consumer 
markets. Between the early 1980s and mid-1990s for example, thanks 
to the innovation of crack (a cheaper variation of freebase), cocaine in 
both America and Western Europe socially transitioned from being solely 
the province of bankers and rock stars alone to becoming a readily 
available ghetto drug (Caulkins & MacCoun, 2003, p.438). The opaque 
nature of the market however again renders such analysis necessarily 
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speculative. It also however underlines that drug trafficking networks 
themselves, which are of necessity characterized by small world 
networks and poor strategic information flows, will clearly not respond to 
external interventions, increased transaction costs, and legislative 
signalling in the manner that rational actor or GVC economic models 
might typically predict (Caulkins & MacCoun, 2003).   
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Case Study: Afghan heroin as a GCC 
The two main commodity chains considered in the current study are 
the chains Afghanistan-EU and North Africa-EU, in terms of heroin and 
hashish respectively. An extremely preliminary outline of Afghan chain 
dynamics will be offered here. The scale of local opium production is 
a function at least in part of the nexus between regional geopolitics 
and Afghan economic conditions. With some of the lowest indicators of 
human development from a global perspective, Afghanistan is one of 
the poorest countries in the world. Annual domestic revenue of the 
Afghan state is only around 5 percent of licit GDP, and in 2010 
Afghanistan was judged the second most corrupt country in the world 
(UNODC 2010). Afghanistan has been a source of opium production for 
many decades, but the scale of opium cultivation there exploded during 
the 1980s as a side effect of the conflict dynamics generated by the 
Soviet intervention (1979-89). Following a brief but severe crackdown on 
cultivation by the Taliban in 2000-2001, it then expanded even more 
dramatically up until 2008.  
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Opium Production in Afghanistan, 1932-2006 (metric tonnes) 
(Singh, 2007, p.13) 
1932 1956 1989 1994 1999 2002 2004 2005 2006 
75 12 800 3,416 4,565 3,400 4,200 4,100 6,100 
 
Potential Opium Production in Afghanistan, 2006-2012 (metric tonnes) 
(UNODC Annual Opium Survey, 2007-2012) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
8,200 7,700 6,900 3,600 5,800 3,700 
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The explosion in Afghan opium production from 1980 onwards 
was accompanied by the development of extensive trafficking routes 
running through Iran and Pakistan; since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, a ‘northern route’ running through Central Asia and 
Russia to Europe has emerged as well. Despite the explosion in the 
scale of Afghan opium production, it predominantly remains a rural, 
decentralized phenomenon, with larger traders only engaging in 
purchase, rather than closer mentoring or direction of cultivation. Greater 
vertical integration of organized crime in Afghanistan is nonetheless 
occurring, with pyramids of protection and patronage emerging in a 
restructured form post-2001 (Byrd & Buddenberg, 2006, p.200).  
Key traffickers within Afghanistan have typically formed significant 
political connections at both the central and local level, and often enjoy 
effective immunity from local law enforcement. The production of heroin 
within Afghanistan itself has also become more organized in recent 
years, via the import of large quantities of chemical precursors and the 
establishment of local drug labs-during the 1980s, the majority of these 
labs existed in Pakistan. Heroin, morphine and raw opium are then 
trafficked out of Afghanistan via three main routes-north through Central 
Asia, west through Iran, and south and east through India and 
Pakistan.  
Estimates regarding the ratio of trafficking between these three 
routes have altered continuously over time. During the 1980s, Pakistan 
was commonly felt to be the main trafficking corridor, with a drug 
trafficking route south overlapping with an American and Saudi-funded 
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arms trafficking route north from Karachi; indeed it is commonly 
believed that the two commodities in fact travelled on the same trucks. 
Pakistan itself was at the time a significant site of both heroin 
production and consumption; in 1979 Pakistani opium production stood 
at 300 tonnes versus Afghanistan’s 270 tonnes, and Pakistan’s numbers 
of registered heroin addicts in the early 1980s exploded from 5,000 
users in 1980 to over 1.3 million by the middle of the decade (Singh, 
2007, p.174, Haq, 1996, p.954). After 1989, the significance of the 
northern and western trafficking routes for Afghan opium steadily grew, 
whilst domestic opium cultivation in Pakistan itself had already 
substantially declined. After 2001 and Western military intervention, the 
significance of opiate trafficking within Afghanistan also increased. In 
2003, the UN estimated that 65 percent of Afghan opiates passed 
through Central Asia, but this was subsequently revised radically 
downwards to 15 percent, then revised up again in 2010 to 25 
percent. The Iranian route by contrast is held in the latest UNODC 
report to account for 35 percent of the Afghan heroin traffic, and 
Pakistan for the remaining 40 percent. (Chouvy, 2003, p.31, Chouvy, 
2009, p.87, UNODC, 2012, p.9.). Trafficking through Turkmenistan also 
appears to feed the ‘Balkan route’ via Turkey, rather than the Russian 
‘Northern Route’. Trafficking by all routes remains in the main 
dominated by the use of existing road networks, but with a growing 
role played by rail in Central Asia. Turkey in general continues to 
remain a recognized hub point in current trafficking routes, beyond 
which opiates are trafficked into Europe via the ‘Balkan route’. For the 
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sake of brevity, the trafficking phenomenon here will be considered with 
regard to two states in particular-Russia and Turkey. 
Eck and Gersh (2000) analyzed drug trafficking organizations 
according to two models: concentrated industry and cottage industry. 
The concentrated industry model posits that drug trafficking from 
production to retail is controlled by a few highly organized, oligopolistic, 
and hierarchically structured groups. The cottage industry model asserts 
that drug trafficking, from production to retail, is managed by a large 
number of small groups and individuals, which form and break-up 
easily. There is little empirical research to show that Turkish drug 
trafficking organizations fit either the concentrated model or the cottage 
model. Nonetheless, a 2007 Turkish drug report (Ünal, 2009, p.31) 
showed that most of the drug trafficked from Turkey is organized by a 
few family-based criminal groups. These groups may be classified by 
their role in trafficking. Some of them specialize in bringing drugs from 
Asia to Turkey, some of them specialize in converting morphine-based 
drugs to heroin, some of them are experts at transporting the drugs, 
and others distribute drugs to Western Europe. In 1995, the Turkish 
National Policy began a very complex network analysis, which included 
every drug trafficking case in the past 10 years. Those cases were 
analyzed by modern network-analysis software, and the analysis is 
updated regularly. The network analysis showed that most heroin 
traffickers in Turkey are somewhat related to 40 main groups, and that 
there is no clear distinction between trafficking groups. According to this 
analysis, there are three main types of traffickers in Turkey: 
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(a) traffickers who are members of family–based organizations 
and work under an informal hierarchy,  
(b) traffickers who are free of any large and structured 
organization, and  
(c) traffickers who work for or pay taxes to terrorist organizations 
(Ünal, 2009, p.32).  
This categorization loosely fits the typology found by Natarajan 
and Belanger (1998). Domestic heroin trafficking in Turkey starts from 
two regions (i.e. Hakkari and Van) on the Iranian border, and most of 
the traffickers head mainly to Istanbul or, rarely, to southern Turkey 
(i.e. Gaziantep, Hatay, Adana, and Mersin) where traffickers arrange for 
exportation or sale of the heroin to other traffickers. Most of the heroin 
seizures in eastern and central Turkey are intercepted between the 
Iranian border region and these two western destinations. The most 
recent research in this field suggests that the common vehicle type 
used is passenger car; TIR trucks are almost never used in domestic 
trafficking (Ünal, 2009, pp.126-8). Other vehicles types employed are 
lorries and vans. Interdiction of drug traffickers in Turkey is a 
responsibility divided between the TNP (Turkish National Police) and 
Jandarma, with the TNP operating in the cities whilst the Jandarma 
operates in the countryside. 
Trafficking in Russia and Central Asia has been the subject of 
relatively fewer detailed open source studies, but the majority of 
evidence currently available again points, in Russia at least, to the 
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existence of a small scale, strategically disconnected, and diverse 
‘cottage industry’ model of drug trafficking, with a significant ethnocentric 
component. The review conducted by Paoli in 2001 of court cases in 
Russia related to organized crime and drug trafficking identified the 
majority of such cases to be directed against small groups of 
individuals of as few as four people at a time. The economic crisis 
affecting large numbers of Russian citizens in the 1990s produced a 
spontaneous, bottom-up level of participation by many ordinary citizens 
in obtaining and selling illicit drugs, even as more networked ‘conflict 
entrepreneurs’ also participated in, and co-managed, a mid-level 
restructuring of previously state-held asset privatization. The latter 
process of course also saw organized crime elements move into many 
‘legitimate’ business sectors for money laundering purposes. At the 
same time, specific ethnic groups-Chechens, Roma, Tajiks- are 
consistently identified in Russian reports as being particularly involved in 
drug trafficking. These reports also mirror to a significant degree a 
wider level of social stigmatization towards these groups across Russian 
society as a whole (Paoli, 2001).  
Drug trafficking and drug consumption have also risen to the top 
of the Russian state’s official security agenda, despite figures regarding 
the number of Russian addicts and consumers remaining remarkably 
contested and imprecise. Open source estimates quote the current 
number of Russian heroin addicts, for example, as ranging at anything 
between 2 to 5 million individuals, depending on whether drug addiction 
in general or heroin use in particular (the two figures being often 
confused) is being referenced (Walker, 2009, Inkster & Comolli, 2012, 
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p.125, Golunov, 2007, p.337). Even accepting the lower-end official 
government estimate of some 2.5 million heroin addicts however, the 
UNODC in 2009 estimated that Russia in 2008 accounted for 21 
percent of world heroin consumption, vs. a European market share 
(Europe being here taken to exclude Russia and Turkey) of 26 percent 
(UNODC, 2009, p.11). By this estimate, Russia comes second only to 
Europe in terms of global heroin consumption, with the per capita ratio 
of addicts in Russia being even higher than in Europe, and with 
Russia also, when considered on a state-to-state basis, coming first in 
the world in terms of total heroin consumption. 
 Since its establishment in 2003, the counter-narcotics arm of the 
Russian government, the FSKN, has struggled to coordinate a range of 
interventions aimed at reducing the harms caused to Russian state 
interests and national security by both drug trafficking and drug 
consumption. Criticism in particular is frequently levelled at its efforts in 
the field of demand reduction, treatment, and rehabilitation. The FSKN 
itself has, by statute, a maximum establishment of around 40,000 
personnel, four times the size of its nearest American equivalent, the 
DEA, and also differs from that organization, in that it answers directly 
to the Russian President rather than the Ministry of Justice. In 2007 
the State Anti-Drug Committee (GAK) was created in part to address 
concerns that the approach of the FSKN up until that date had been 
unbalanced and excessively repressive, with the State Anti-Drug 
Committee intended to better co-ordinate action between the law 
enforcement agencies and the respective ministries responsible for 
health, education, and social development (Renz, 2011, pp.60-1, 65-66).  
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The preliminary outline given here naturally raises as many 
questions as it offers answers about the nature and dynamics of the 
Afghan commodity chain as it currently operates. Some preliminary 
research questions follow below.    
Research questions 
Unintended Consequences and GCC (1): Rise in violence 
The creation of GCC black markets in illicit drugs, which then 
come to automatically constitute large-scale ‘lootable resources’ given 
their unregulated nature, has clearly played a significant role in the 
generation and perpetuation of both ‘limited access orders’ (Afghanistan, 
Burma, many Central Asian states), and in sharp increases in the 
general level of intrastate violence in many territories (Afghanistan, 
Mexico, Colombia). This general rise of violence in both production and 
transit trade countries is clearly unevenly distributed however, with some 
states seemingly disproportionately affected (Mexico), whilst in other 
states the emergence of parasitic or symbiotic relationships has if 
anything arguably had a somewhat stabilising effect for the overall 
state-building project (Burma, Afghanistan). Both GCC and HPR theory 
therefore offer useful analytical perspectives to examine the phenomenon 
of ‘managed prohibition’ in the countries currently under study, which, 
when following the chain, also represent a transition from ‘limited 
access’ to ‘open access’ orders. Afghanistan and Morocco, despite both 
being ‘limited access’ orders, are in many ways polar opposites in 
terms of general levels of societal violence related to management of 
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the drugs trade. Useful research questions that might flow from this 
are: 
(a) To what degree might general levels of violence be related to 
the relative status of the drug as a geopolitically scarce 
‘lootable resource’? With marijuana production occurring globally 
on a prolific scale, including an increasing quantity of such 
production within the EU, whilst opium and heroin by contrast 
are manufactured in only a few states, the political and conflict 
dynamics of the two commodities in production countries may 
simply be a function of their very different global production 
patterns.  
(b) The relative mark-ups in value when comparing opium and 
marijuana likewise merit scrutiny when considering the very 
different levels of social violence and associated perceptual risk 
between the two commodity chains concerned. Violence 
however is clearly also related to perceived structural 
vulnerability. It would be useful in particular to try to gain 
some deeper understanding of whether the networks involved in 
marijuana really socio-economically correlate with those involved 
in heroin, perhaps utilizing police reports along the lines of 
Malm & Bichler’s (2011) study of ‘small world networks’ of 
collaborating criminals.  
(c) Variations in legality and health classification between the two 
commodities clearly also carry implications in levels of 
perceived risk and profit alongside perceptible levels of societal 
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stress, with marijuana having become socially acceptable in 
contexts where heroin is still formally condemned. 
(d) There may also be a strong argument to state that the 
‘balloon effect’ is proportionately a much weaker phenomenon 
in relation to marijuana than it is to opium, something to be 
explored. 
(e) The dynamics in transit countries also need to be further 
explored, not least in terms of understanding why Russia, 
Turkey or the Central Asian states (for example) are not 
Mexico, despite the profit margins/street price mark ups of 
heroin being comparable to cocaine. 
Unintended Consequences and GCC (2): Rise in mark-ups and the 
presumption of an ‘inelastic market’. 
The main effort of supply-side focused CN policies during the past 
thirty to forty years-to so disrupt supplies that the street price rises 
precipitously, leading the addict community to shrink proportionately-has 
clearly been a failure. This raises questions both over the presumption 
that the consumer market is essentially ‘mature’ and inelastic, and over 
the presumption that the illicit drug market corresponds to a rational 
actor economic model. A significant GCC orientated question would be 
to ask where the mark-ups in value occur along the nodes between 
production and consumption, and to what degree they are in reality 
dynamic. Both Byrd and Buddenberg (2006) and Pietschmann (2004) 
highlighted price setting and price manipulation in the ‘middle stage’ 
countries as a major explanatory factor in how the illicit drug market 
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currently operates in terms of cushioning upstream price volatility in 
Afghanistan, and also as an area meriting further research. Both Russia 
and Kazakhstan for example have expanding consumption markets in 
addition to being major transit chain countries. It would be useful to 
also try to nail down the factors behind the ‘heroin drought’ of 2010, 
which did cause street prices to spike, and which clearly needs to be 
categorized either as a coincidental non-trend anomaly, produced by a 
whole range of essentially unrelated factors, or as the product of 
conscious interagency policy which merits inculcation and further 
perpetuation.   
Unintended Consequences and GCC (3) The emergence of new 
networks, and the stigmatization of social, religious and ethnic groups. 
Lupsha offers a typology of state/organized crime interactions which it 
may prove worthwhile attempting to map against the two commodity 
chains concerned, in the context of course of the general concept of 
‘negotiated prohibition’ and HPRs. Turkey, Kazakhstan and Russia offer 
interesting parallel case studies of countries that sit on the middle level 
between being ‘limited access’ and ‘open access’ orders, and that could 
be read to correspond to the definition of ‘mature’ limited access 
orders given by North and his co-authors. These orders however are 
also stabilized very often on the basis of excluding or stigmatizing 
certain social and ethnic groups, and this stigmatization is also woven 
in many instances into the rhetoric of the illicit drug prohibition regime 
in each country. Stigmatization produces, in response, coping strategies 
and behaviours which perpetuate community isolation and conflict 
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dynamics. This raises an interesting range of potential UC-related 
research questions from the perspective of both human rights and civil 
society organisations in these countries-how do communities stigmatized 
by government narratives self-organize, and to what degree does an 
informal feedback loop exist between the central government and these 
communities? To what degree have the conflict dynamics encapsulated 
in this relationship become both effectively contained (the ‘stable’ 
instability of ‘frozen’ conflicts) and self-perpetuating? A related question 
is of course the extent to which the overarching regime of prohibition 
itself is in fact stabilising or destabilising these dynamics at the country 
level (see below). 
Unintended Consequences and GCC (4): ‘Resource curse’ or source of 
stabilization and local capital formation? 
It is generally accepted that illicit drugs generate far more value 
outside producing countries than in them. The degree to which illicit 
drug markets are stabilizing or destabilizing, and the potential for state 
destabilization to be a major unintended consequence of more effective 
prohibition, nonetheless remains contested, with both Burma and 
Afghanistan forming examples of states where a recent boom in illicit 
drug production has historically accompanied state-building (increasing 
governmental capacity) rather than state collapse (see Goodhand, 2008). 
Clearly if the current prohibition regime in certain countries in practice 
produces perverse, unintended stabilizing effects within otherwise 
potentially highly unstable limited access order systems (Burma, 
Afghanistan, North Africa)-by producing an array of rent-gathering actors 
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and shadow networks that are in practice in balance with each other-
this raises questions about the potential unintended consequences of 
any future alteration in the current focus of prohibition, whether towards 
complete eradication or the other extreme of decriminalization/legalization. 
The following research questions therefore merit being asked: is 
prohibition in some states producing the unintended consequence of 
actually generating a greater degree of relative stability/internal balancing 
where otherwise such stability would not exist? Given that the 
implementation of prohibition in certain production countries also requires 
substantial external resourcing (the ANA & ANP in Afghanistan, or the 
alternative example of Colombia), resourcing which will require fluctuate 
and in all likelihood decline over the medium to longer term, to what 
degree is prohibition in these states perpetuating untenable ‘rentier 
states’ in the medium to longer term, and what could be done about 
it? 
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